433 specifically that the opposition had filed

The Suez-gas of France paper is far from over, but the solemn vote which will take place this afternoon in the National Assembly marks a critical step in the reconciliation of the two companies. It also represents a political victory for Dominique de Villepin, who left defeated episode of the first contract hires, was in fear of the new test.

When there is almost all of the ingredients of this reform, there is indeed she behaved in germ exactly the same political risks than those of the SCE. There were first the delicate subject because in a taboo: the privatization of a public service, on a background of World War II energy. A priori as explosive as the flexibility that resulted in the SCE. And not necessarily well taken because, prior to be presented as an offensive operation to secure French energy supply, the merger Suez-gas of France was designed as a defensive operation aimed at protecting Suez of possible hostile Italian Enel OPA.

Second big handicap: the State of the majority with one side the UDF entry in dissent and of other elected officials UMP deeply skeptical, because their voters fear a future rise in the price of gas and themselves are skeptical of the merits of the project: the new set, think many of them will not have the critical size to resist a takeover bid, so that the privatization of gas of Francebe an opportunity, is in reality a threat to the energy independence of the France and for the independence of the country all short. Analysis very close to that of the left who opposed (and still opposed) to the privatization of GDF the constitution of a large public pole of energy around EDF and GDF. On this subject, as on the CPE, Dominique de Villepin could very well be taken back by a United gaullo-communo-socialist coalition in the glorification of a public sector presented as protector face liberal adventure.

The floating of the majority was all the more dangerous for the Prime Minister that, third parameter, the pattern of the UMP, Nicolas Sarkozy, had no personal reason to support the operation. On the contrary is that, in 2004, was committed when he was Minister of economy, finance and industry to ensure that the participation of the State in the capital of France gas does not fall below 70. Difficult to come back on the floor when it is a candidate in the presidential election and that it promises to voters to do what it says and say what you do. August 15, to the determination of Jacques Chirac and Dominique de Villepin, Nicolas Sarkozy had certainly declared on television that it would support the project but without dissuading its relatives issue strong reservations, which left him to take his distance at any time in case things turn bad. And things had indeed likely wrong turn to Parliament because the opposition, fourth parameter, had only a strategy in mind: renew the stroke of the CPE, i.e. forcing the Prime Minister to use the procedure that is authoritarian 49 - 3 to vote its text, which would not have failed to reinforce his image of authoritarian man and discredit him permanently in the eyes of the public.

Fortunately for Dominique de Villepin, history never repeats itself. It would have same trend, in this particular case to contradict itself because the defeated two political moment are precisely those that had triumphed in the case of the CPE: PS, in deciding to abandon the parliamentary guerrilla and conclude an agreement with the President of the National Assembly on September 19, gave the impression to abandon the party, which failed to generate strong eddies in its ranks. As Nicolas Sarkozy, will not choose this afternoon between two bad options: vote the Bill and to cry or not the vote and threaten the unity of the majority, which is never good so close to an election deadline. That so happened to Dominique de Villepin so thus the trap Understand, it is trying to decrypt the springs which are only to a few months away only this rebellious country is the France is reformed or is not.

First, there is no doubt that the Prime Minister was able to learn the lessons of failure on PBS. Last January, he left the flower rifle, convinced that he could only change the fate of young people. When the street began to howl, he found himself without any support. In the case of the merger Suez-GDF, management was instead very collective and intensive preparation. "I met personally 240 parliamentarians," boasts Thierry Breton, Minister of the economy. The two companies have also wet shirt by developing an effective lobbying with parliamentarians. The National Assembly, the Prime Minister found valuable allies in the person of Henri Cuq, the Minister of Relations with Parliament, Patrick Ollier, the Chairman of the Committee for Economic Affairs, and especially Jean-Louis Debré, President of the National Assembly, which, with a sense of the drama, was photographed in the Chamber surrounded by the mountain of amendments 137.433 specifically that the opposition had filed. In so doing, he pointed to the outset of the PS and PC error which, in a suicidal pre-election bid, to caricatures are playing the obstruction instead of letting the debate to settle. 5,000 amendments for a reform of this magnitude, it was understandable, more 137.433, it was excessive. "At this point, it is the ultra-leftism!", exclaims the Socialist Senator Michel Charasse. But, more fundamentally, it is weak mobilization of the street the political victory of Prime Minister: moment unions struggling to mobilize on the privatization of GDF, PS and PC could not long continue their obstruction and the UMP had an interest in returning to the rank.

This small street mobilization confirms organiser rules: first, it is very difficult to organiser two successive social movements. Perfectly assisted by trade unions in the spring, the student frond of the spring against the CPE has somehow killed the mobilization of the fall on SFM. She further killed him that the presidential election is planned in seven months: from the time when the French know that they can speak rapidly in the polls, they are hardly likely to manifest. "It is at this point that the price of the privatization of GDF will pay," attempts to comfort the left. Even as third lesson, if privatizations have sometimes resulted in beautiful political wrangling Francois Mitterrand blocking in 1986 orders him was Jacques Chirac they did never really mobilized the opinion. The French certainly don't like them but they had to solve, as inevitable. Much like the left, quick to denounce them when it is in the opposition, took them when it is in power: the privatization of gas of France was already seriously study when Lionel Jospin at Matignon.